In many situations a player may act so as to maximize a perceived utility that does not coincide with the objective of the system analyst or designer. Such discrepancies may arise due to rational factors (such as tolls or restricted budgets), or due to cognitive biases such as those that are common in behavioral economics: risk attitudes, altruism, present-bias and so on. When analyzing a game, one may ask how inefficiency, as measured by the Price of Anarchy (PoA), is affected by the perceived utilities. This question is especially challenging in the presence of heterogeneous biases, where each player essentially plays a different game.
INTRODUCTION
Game theory is founded on the assumption that players are rational decision makers, i.e. maximizing their utility, and that groups of agents reach an equilibrium outcome. However agents, either human or automated, often have bounded resources that prevent them from finding the optimal response in every situation. Further, human decision makers are prone to various cognitive and behavioral biases, such as riskaversion, loss-aversion, tendency to focus on short-term utility and so on.
As a concrete example, commuters may have some information on the expected congestion at each route via traffic reports or a cellphone app. However they also know that this information is inaccurate, and a risk-averse driver might take into account not just the expected congestion, but also the variance, standard deviation, a heuristic safety margin and so on. Further, different commuters may have different levels of risk-aversion, or act upon different heuristics and personal preferences.
The implications of these limitations and biases on game playing can be similarly described: from the perspective of an outside observer (who cares about the actual total latency), the players are playing the "wrong game," either by applying some simple heuristics, or by optimizing a different utility function from the one in the game specification [Devetag and Warglien 2008] .
Fortunately, as long as we can incorporate the biases that affect agents into suitably modified utility (or cost) functions, we can still use traditional equilibrium concepts. More formally, suppose that in the real underlying game G each agent i has some utility function u i . Now, each player i sees her utility as some other functionû i , and thus we are interested in the equilibria of the biased gameĜ comprised of modified utilities {û i }. Crucially, we still measure the quality of the outcome on the real game G (see Footnote 6 for further discussion).
Nonatomic congestion games are a good testbed for such ideas. First, they have very convenient theoretical properties, such as the existence of a potential function and the uniqueness of equilibrium (up to identical utilities). Second, equilibrium inefficiency and in particular the Price of Anarchy is very well understood. Third, several cognitive and behavioral biases have already been suggested and studied in the context of congestion games (see Related Work).
Our starting point in this paper is the smoothness framework for nonatomic congestion games in the Wardrop [1952] model. The smoothness framework connects a particular property of the edge cost functions (say, (1, 1 4 )-smoothness of affine functions), with a tight upper bound on the price of anarchy (PoA), this bound also being independent of the network topology [Roughgarden 2003 ].
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Smoothness for modified costs has also been considered; e.g. by Bonifaci et al. [2011] in the context of tolls that can also be viewed as a perturbation on utilities. The definition of smoothness naturally extends to account for bias, and the modified definition (which contains both the real cost c and the biased costĉ) guarantees a biased price of anarchy (BPoA) bound in a similar manner to standard smoothness PoA analysis. Moreover, while Bonifaci et al. [2011] considered a particular modified cost function, the same biased-smoothness approach works for any combination of c andĉ.
Thus the PoA is not only robust to the network topology and to different notions of equilibrium [Roughgarden 2009 ], but also to players that are not playing exactly by the game specification, as long as they all have the same bias.
Heterogeneous agents. Due to personal differences, it is unlikely that all of the participants in a game have exactly the same bias (see our example above on risk-aversion). Thus, the latency of some agents might be affected not just by their own behavior, but also by the behavior of other agents that are subject to different biases. Deriving bounds on the total latency for every game, and for every possible composition of biases in the population, seems like a daunting task.
Rather, an important challenge is to leverage general properties such as known PoA bounds and smoothness bounds, to derive BPoA bounds for heterogeneous populations-much like standard smoothness is leveraged to derive PoA bounds for broad classes of games. This would enable us to take results (both known and new) from simpler games, and combine them to bound the objective total latency in games with arbitrary heterogeneous biases.
It might be worthy to note that smoothness is sometimes considered "less interesting" in nonatomic routing games, since it does not lead to more robust PoA bounds in terms of mixed and correlated equilibria [Blum et al. 2006] . However our results show how smoothness is useful for a different kind of robustness, namely to heterogeneous biases.
In Section 2 we briefly go over the standard model of nonatomic congestion games, price of anarchy and smoothness. We also introduce a new measure of network complexity called the parallel-width. In Section 3 we extend the definition of a smooth cost function to a more general notion of (λ,μ)-biased-smoothness, following similar extensions for specific modified costs [Bonifaci et al. 2011; Chen et al. 2011] . We then provide positive results by leveraging two types of simpler bounds. In our main result (Section 4), we consider a heterogeneous population where the cost functions of each type i are biased-smooth for some parameters (λ i ,μ i ).
• We show that players are affected mainly by their own bias, and the negative externalities due to the biases of other agent types are bounded by the parallel-width of the network.
• We conclude that for networks with a fixed parallel width, the BPoA in a game with a mixed population of different behavior types is bounded in terms of the average biased smoothness parameters of all the participating types. We emphasize that this holds regardless of the specific biases, as long as for each agent type we have established smoothness.
• We complete the upper bounds with lower bounds, showing how biased agents can increase the cost of their peers by a factor proportional to the parallel-width.
For the special case of polynomial cost functions, we leverage (Section 5) known results on the PoA in heterogeneous games to derive a structure-independent BPoA bound. However, in contrast to our main result, this bound depends on the worst bias rather than on the average bias. Finally, we prove biased-smoothness for several classes of cost functions with particular homogenous behavioral biases (Section 7). These bounds can be combined with the general results above to provide BPoA bounds for games with heterogeneous biases. We conclude with a comparison to related work, a discussion of our results, and suggest some directions for future work.
PRELIMINARIES
Nonatomic routing games. Following the definitions of Roughgarden [2003] and Roughgarden and Tardos [2004] , a nonatomic routing game (NRG) is a tuple G = G, m, c, s, t, r , where
• m ∈ N is the number of agent types; • c = (c e ) e∈E , c e (x) ≥ 0 is the cost incurred when x agents use edge e; 2 • s, t ∈ V m , where (s i , t i ) are the source and target nodes of type i agents; • r ∈ R m + , where r i ∈ R + is the total mass of type i agents. The total mass of agents of all types is i≤m r i = r, and we assume unless specified otherwise that r = 1.
As in Roughgarden [2007] , we omit some of the parameters when clear from the context, e.g. write (G, c, r).
We denote by A i ⊆ 2 E the set of all directed paths between the pair of nodes (s i , t i ) in the graph. Thus A i is the the set of actions available to agents of type i. We denote by A = ∪ i A i the set of all directed source-target paths. We assume that all cost functions mentioned in the paper (including biased costs mentioned later on) are non-decreasing, continuous, differentiable and semi-convex (i.e., xc e (x) is convex). Such cost functions are called standard [Roughgarden 2003 ].
A:4 R. Meir and D. Parkes Player-specific costs. A nonatomic routing game with player-specific costs (PNRG) is a tuple G = G, m, (c i ) i≤m , s, t, r . The difference from a NRG is that agents of each type i experience a cost of c i e (x) when x agents use edge e. We can have multiple types with the same source and target nodes to allow diversity of behavior. To avoid confusion, we refer to (s i , t i ) (or A i ) as the demand type and to c i as the cost type. Thus the type i specifies both the demand type and the cost type.
A PNRG is symmetric if all agents have the same demand type, i.e., A i = A for all i. A PNRG is a resource selection game (RSG) if G is a graph of parallel links. That is, if the action of every agent is to select a single edge.
Flows.
A flow (or action profile) of a PNRG is a vector f ∈ R |A|×m + , where f p,i is the amount of agents of type i that use path p ∈ A i . In a valid flow, p∈Ai f p,i = r i for all i. The total traffic on path p ∈ A is denoted by f p = m i=1 f p,i . Similarly, the total traffic on edge e ∈ E is denoted by f e = p:e∈p f p . Denote the support of type i strategy by
That is, all paths used by type i agents in flow f .
The cost for a player of type i in game G, selecting a path p ∈ A i in flow f , is
Social cost. We denote by SC i (G, f ) = p∈Ai f i,p c(p, f ) the cost experienced by type i agents in flow f . By summing over all types, we get the social cost:
Thus the social cost only depends on the total traffic per edge.
Remark 2.1. This social cost provides an objective measure of the total latency in the system. However, the players in our model may act based on different cost functions, either because they have a different objective than simply minimizing their latency, or because they are affected by cognitive and behavioral biases. We provide examples of both types of discrepancies in Section 3.1.
We omit the argument G when it is clear from the context. We denote by f o (G) ∈ argmin f SC (G, f ) some profile with minimal total cost, and
Equilibrium. A flow f for an PNRG is an equilibrium in game G if for every agent type i, any used path p ∈ P i (f ) and any p ′ ∈ A i , we have c
That is, if no agent can switch to a path with a lower cost. This provides the analogy of a Nash equilibrium for nonatomic games, and it extends naturally for player-specific NRGs.
It is known that in any NRG there is at least one equilibrium, and that this can be reached by a simple best-response dynamic. Further, all equilibria have the same social cost and in every equilibrium all agents of type i experience the same cost [Aashtiani and Magnanti 1981; Milchtaich 2000; Roughgarden and Tardos 2004] . Player-specific NRGs are also guaranteed to have at least one equilibrium [Schmeidler 1973 ], however, equilibrium costs may not be unique, and best-response dynamics may not converge, except in the special case of parallel links [Gairing et al. 2011] .
Affine routing games.
In an affine NRG, all cost functions take the form of a linear function. That is, c e (x) = a e x + b e for some constants a e ≥ 0, b e ≥ 0. The social cost can be written as SC (G, f ) = e∈E a e (f e ) 2 + b e f e . Pigou's example is the special case of an affine RSG with two resources, where c 1 (x) = 1 and c 2 (x) = ax. We denote by G P (a, 1) the instance where c 2 (x) = ax (and c 1 (x) = 1), and G P (a, d) the instance where c 2 (x) = ax d (and c 1 (x) = 1).
The price of anarchy. Let EQ(G) be the set of equilibria in game G. The price of anarchy (PoA) of a game is the ratio between the social cost in the worst equilibrium in EQ(G) and the optimal social cost [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] . Since all equilibria have the same cost, we can write PoA(G) =
OPT (G) , where f * is any equilibrium of G. For example in affine NRGs, it is known that PoA(G) ≤ 4 3 , and this bound is attained by the Pigou example G P (1, 1) [Roughgarden and Tardos 2004] . Roughgarden 2009 ].
3 Moreover, w.l.o.g. λ = 1 (that is, for any class of cost functions there is an optimal pair (1, µ) for some µ [Correa et al. 2004; Roughgarden and Tardos 2004] ).
For example, affine routing games are (1, 
Parallel-width of graphs
Definition 2.2. A set of edges S ⊆ E of edges is parallel if there are vertices s, t ∈ V and some S ′ ⊆ E s.t. S ⊆ S ′ , and S ′ is a minimal s − t cut in the graph G;
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Intuitively, S indicates that there are at least |S| paths between s and t, although these paths may not be completely distinct.
Definition 2.3. A set of edges S ⊆ E is crossed if there is a simple directed path p that contains S.
Definition 2.4. The parallel-width of a graph, PW(G), is the size of the largest set S ⊆ E that is both parallel and crossed.
For example, in the Brass graph (Fig 1(a) ) the minimal cuts are: {sa, sb}, {at, bt}, and {sb, ab, at}. Thus the set {sa, bt} is both parallel and crossed; the set {sb, at} is parallel but not crossed; the set {sa, at} is crossed but not parallel; and the set {sa, sb, ab} is neither.
Note that for any nonempty graph G = (V, E), we have 1 ≤ PW(G) ≤ |V | − 1. The lower bound is since any single edge is both parallel and crossed, and the upper bound since there is no simple path of length |V | or more.
For any k ≥ 2, we define the k-crossed-parallel graph G CP (k) as follows. G = (V, E), where V = {s, t, a 2 , . . . , a k , b 1 , . . . , b k−1 }, and Figure 4 .
The 2-crossed-parallel graph is the Braess graph. There are other generalizations of the Braess graph but we are unaware of one that coincides with ours.
5
By construction, the parallel-width of the k-crossed-parallel graph is exactly k, where
Thus each vertex in V ′ corresponds to some vertex in V , and every edge in E ′ corresponds to some path in G. Let E i ⊆ E be some minimal a i − b i cut in G, and let e i be some edge in E i . The set i≤k E i is a minimal s − t cut in a subgraph of G, and thus S = {e 1 , . . . , e k } is contained in some minimal cut of G. Also there is a path p in G that contains S. Thus PW(G) ≥ |S| = k.
In the other direction, suppose that PW(G) ≥ k, then there is a set S = {e 1 , . . . , e k } that is part of a minimal cut between some s, t. Also there is a s − t path p ′ containing S, w.l.o.g. in that lexicographic order. For every i ≤ k, there must be some path p i from s to t such that e i ∈ p i , and e j / ∈ p i for all j = i, otherwise we could drop e i from S and still get a s − t cut. Denote e i = (a i , b i ). Note that a i+1 = b i for all i, as otherwise the minimal cut between s − t is either between s and b i = a i+1 (in which case e i+1 is redundant) or between b i = a i+1 and t (in which case e i is redundant). We also argue that a i = a j , b i = b j for all i = j, as otherwise the (simple) path p ′ is cyclic, which is a contradiction. Also, s = a i for all i > 1 as otherwise p 1 ∪ p ′ form a cycle s − a 1 − b 1 − · · · − a i = s. Similarly, and t = b i for all i < k.
We now construct the following 2k-node minor on {a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a k , b k }, by contracting any path between a pair of vertices to a single edge. The following edges (paths in G) must exist for any i ≤ k: e i = (a i , b i ) as defined above; (s, a i ) and (b i , t) due to the path p i ; and (b i , a i+1 ) (for i < k) due to p ′ and since b i = a i+1 . We eliminate all edges in G that are not part of such a path. Finally, since there is a path s − a 1 ⊆ p 1 in G, we contract it to a single vertex s ′ = a. We similarly contract the path b k − t to a single vertex t ′ . Thus the minor we get is exactly the graph CP (k).
A directed series-parallel (DSP) graph is an acyclic directed graph (V, E, s, t) with a source s and a target t, and is composed recursively.
The basic graph is a single directed edge s − t. Two DSPs (V 1 , E 1 , s 1 , t 2 ), (V 2 , E 2 , s 2 , t 2 ) can be composed to obtain a new DSP either in a serial way: merge s 1 with t 2 ; or in a parallel way by merging s 1 with s 2 , and t 1 with t 2 . A (non-directed) series-parallel graph is obtained by taking a DSP and removing edge orientations.
It is known that a directed 2-terminal network G is a DSP iff it excludes the Braess graph (the graph that appears in Fig. 3 ) as a topological minor [Milchtaich 2006 ], which by Lemma 2.5 occurs iff PW(G) ≤ 1.
For a game G = (G, c, r), we define PW(G) = PW(G) (but see Footnote 4).
Playing the Wrong Game A:7
BIASED COSTS
Given an NRG G = G, m, c, s, t, r and modified cost functionsĉ i e for every type i ≤ m and edge e ∈ E, we obtain a PNRGĜ = G, m, (c i ) i≤m , s, t, r . We assume that players act based on their modified cost functions, irrespective of whether this is a rational behavior or not (see Remark 2.1). We refer toĜ as the biased game, where every agent of type i experiences a cost ofĉ i e rather than c e . We say that G is homogeneous if all players inĜ have the same cost type (same bias).
Both games G andĜ have a role in our model. Definition 3.1. A nonatomic routing game with biased costs is a tuple G = G,Ĝ , whereĜ is a biased version of G.
The way we interpret G is that players play the wrong gameĜ (and thus, it is the equilibria ofĜ that matter), whereas their true costs are according to game G. In other words, the biased costsĉ i e affect behavior while the actual cost in flow f is the original true cost c(f ), and it is this true cost that determines welfare.
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Biased Price of Anarchy. We measure the price of anarchy in a game with biased costs by comparing the equilibria ofĜ (denoted byf * ) to the optimum of G. Formally:
In the uniform bias case whereĉ i =ĉ for all i, the gameĜ is just another NRG, and thus has a potential function.
In the general case, an equilibrium ofĜ, and thus of G, always exists, althougĥ G may not be a potential game. Existence follows from general existence results on nonatomic games with convex strategy spaces and continuous utilities [Schmeidler 1973] . Chen et al. [2014] referred to the BPoA (when applied to altruism) as the Robust PoA. The Price of Risk Aversion and the Deviation Ratio [Kleer and Schäfer 2016] are similar concepts to the BPoA, except they comparê f * to the equilibrium of the unbiased game G.
Biased Cost Functions
Uncertainty and Risk Aversion. A simple form of biased cost is induced by what we term pessimism, and can be thought of as a special case of risk-aversion. Suppose that whenever faced with some load f e on edge e, an agent believes this number to be inaccurate, and takes a safety margin by playing as if the actual load is α · f e (for some fixed private parameter α ≥ 1). Such an agent will play as if every cost function c e is replaced with a new cost functionĉ α e , whereĉ α e (x) = c e (αx) (see Fig. 1(b) ). This is equivalent to the worst-case-cost model of Meir and Parkes [2015] , which models agents with strict uncertainty over the actual costs.
A somewhat different model considers the uncertainty induced by an arbitrary noise distribution ǫ e (x) (with mean 0), by settingĉ
One may argue that since agents are acting so as to minimize c i rather than c, this is the cost we should take into account when computing welfare. We justify using G as the baseline for welfare in one of two situations: (a) when players are a bounded-rational (e.g., unaware of the true travel time, follow a misguided heuristic, or assigning excessive probabilities to rare outcomes); (b) when the social cost is the goal used by the system designer or analyst, e.g. to minimize the average latency regardless of how the agents feel about the outcome (see also Remark 2.1).
Figure 1: Fig. 1a illustrates a game G that is a quadratic variation of the Braess paradox [Frank 1981 ]. The other subfigures present three biased versions of G. For example, the gameĜ b is played by pessimistic agents, with parameter α = 3. Hence the edges with fixed costs do not change, but the biased cost on the edge a − b for
Figure 2: The social cost in game G from Fig. 1 as a function of the traffic on the edge s − a (assuming symmetric flow). The equilibria of all four games are presented.
that agents prefer paths with a lower variance . Since the variance is additive along the path, we can rewrite the edge cost asĉ γ e (x) = c e (x) + γvar(ǫ e (x)). We assume that var e (x) is bounded by κc e (x) for some constant κ > 0 (see Fig. 1 
(d) for an example that violates this assumption).
The previous examples of biased games assumed players' perceptions that are biased or misguided. The next two examples are cases where the objectives of the players and the analyst/designer differ (see Remark 2.1).
Sensitivity to tolls. Suppose that a central authority imposes an optimal toll of xc ′ e (x) on every edge (where c ′ e (x) is the derivative of c e ). If agents treat the monetary toll and the cost due to delay in the same way, then we get biased cost functionĉ e (x) = c e (x) + xc ′ e (x) = c * e (x), with the effect that the incentives are perfectly aligned with those of the society, and the PoA is 1 [Beckmann et al. 1956] . We emphasize that the designer in this case is only interested in the cost stemming from congestion, and disregards any monetary transfers.
However since the basic cost is in terms of delay, and the toll is in terms of money, different agents may have different money value for time, and hence different toll sensitivity [Cole et al. 2003; Karakostas and Kolliopoulos 2004; Fleischer et al. 2004; Fotakis et al. 2010 ]. This suggests a biased cost functionĉ Fig. 1 (c)). As discussed in Yang and Zheng [2008] these individual differences may be unobservable, and hence cannot be taken into account by the toll mechanism. Chen et al. [2014] used the same biased cost for values β ∈ [0, 1], but in their paper the motivation was altruism rather than tolls.
In our case, the designer does not know the value of β (or its distribution), and does not try to fit the tolls to the present population. Rather, we are interested in the effect of the standard, marginal-cost toll scheme (i.e., optimal for unbiased agents) on the social cost as β varies.
Capacitated resources. Suppose that each edge has a hard capacity limit L e , meaning that a flow f is valid only if f e ≤ L e for all e ∈ E. We can translate this restriction to an endogenous bias, whereĉ e (x) = c e (x) if x ≤ L e , and some large constant M > 0 otherwise. Since this would makeĉ e discontinuous, we can define a similar function that only starts to increase after L e − δ, for exampleĉ δ e (x) = c e (x)(yM + 1)y 2 for all x ≥ L e δ, where y =
. This means that c δ e is standard, equals to c e in the range x ≤ L e , and is greater than M in the range x ≥ L e . As δ → 0, gameĜ approaches the capacitated game. The BPoA then compares the cost of an equilibrium subject to capacity constraints to that of the optimal uncapacitated flow.
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Other types of biases that can be similarly modeled but are not studied in our paper are idiosyncratic preferences to certain strategies [Sandholm 2007] , and altruistic behavior [Caragiannis et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2011] .
Smoothness for Biased Costs
Our goal is to provide bounds on the biased Price of Anarchy for a given game with biased costs G,Ĝ . That each of c e andĉ i e are smooth is insufficient to provide such a bound.
Example 3.2. Consider a game with pessimistic agents G α = G α ,Ĝ α α where G α = G P (2/α, 1), i.e., the Pigou example. For any α the equilibrium ofĜ α α (and thus of G α ) is the same: 1/2 of all agents use each resource. However as α increases, the optimal solution of G shifts more agents to the resource with variable cost, and the optimal social cost decreases to 0. Thus the gap between the equilibrium cost and the optimal cost (the BPoA) goes to infinity with α.
We extend the definition of smoothness to games with biased costs in a way that takes into account both c andĉ. This technique has been applied before for specific modified costs, for example nonatomic games with restricted tolls [Bonifaci et al. 2011] and atomic games with altruistic players [Chen et al. 2011] . We provide an extension that handles general biases.
It is instructive to check the familiar case where there is no bias. Indeed, ifĉ = c, and c is (λ, µ)-smooth, then
and Eq. (5) collapses to the standard definition of smoothness from Eq. (3).
Recall that the PoA of a (λ, µ)-smooth game is bounded by λ 1−µ . This bound extends to games with biased costs that are biased-smooth and when all agents have the same bias. This was explicitly shown for specific biases, but we write down the general formulation for completeness. 
PROOF. The proof extends the standard proof of PoA bounds for nonatomic congestion games via smoothness arguments. In any equilibrium f * , the variational inequality eĉ e (f * e )f * e ≤ eĉ e (f * e )f e holds (see [Correa et al. 2008; Roughgarden 2009] ). Thus,
We get the bound by reorganizing the terms. The only part that differs from the standard smoothness is the first inequality. An alternative derivation of optimal tolls. We can also check that the extension provides the right result in regard to modified costs c * (x) = c(x) + c ′ (x)x that represent optimal tolls and should lead to optimal play [Beckmann et al. 1956 ]. Let's confirm this result via a biased-smoothness argument.
thereby affirming that the price of anarchy of G, G * is 1.
For example, the biased gameĜ c in Fig. 1 has optimal tolls, and we can see in Fig. 2 that its equilibrium x * c minimizes the social cost. Robustness to small biases. Consider some bias s.t. max{ĉ
Thus if c is (λ, µ)-smooth, then c is ((1 + ǫ)λ, (1 + ǫ)µ) biased-smooth w.r.t.ĉ, and the effect on PoA is negligible for small ǫ (provided that µ is not very close to 1).
STRUCTURE-DEPENDENT BOUNDS
The bounds in Section 5 are good in the sense that they are independent of the network structure. Yet even for small biases, the provided bound tends to be fairly high (always higher than 29.5 even for affine functions regardless of the biases), and even if only a small fraction of the agents are biased the effect on the biased PoA can be dramatic. Moreover, as some examples show, it is possible that some types of agents are hurt significantly because of the deviations of others, even if this does not reflect in the overall (biased) PoA.
In this section, we derive a bound, tight up to a constant, on the equilibrium cost for players participating in a game with heterogeneous biases. This bound depends on their own biased-smoothness parameters, as well as on the structure of the network. In some cases, this also allows us to derive BPoA bounds that depend on the average bias, rather than the worst one. Most importantly, our bounds in this section do not assume any specific class of cost functions, and work for any function and any bias, as long as smoothness holds.
Statement of the upper bounds
We define the following variations of a game G = (G, m, c, s, t, r), given a set of biased cost functionsĉ = (ĉ i ) i≤m . Recall that r = i≤m r i .
•
There is only one type in G, and thus also in
In particular, all three derived games are symmetric. Also G i ≡ G i,1 , and G i = G iff G is symmetric. Since all costs in G i,k are the same as in G, then for any profile f , SC(G i,k , f ) = SC(G, f ). Recall our previous definitions:
is a PNRG that is obtained from G by setting the cost type of all type i agents toĉ i .
• G = G,Ĝ is a game with biased costs, where the modified cost functions are obtained for each agent type via a distinct, type-specific mapping.
Suppose we can show biased smoothness of (λ i ,μ i ) for every version of biased costŝ c i . Our primary question is whether we can get a bound on the social cost of any equilibrium of G in terms of the smoothness parameters of all types, and the optimal social cost of G.
In 
The dependence on the structural parameter PW(G) is tight, see Sec. 4.3. Other parameters in the bound can sometimes be relaxed. For example we know that w.l.o.g. λ i = 1 for any class of functions [Correa et al. 2004] , λ = 1 for at least some classes of functions (see Lemma. 4.11), and (1 −μ i ) may be omitted for some biases (see Footnote 8).
Theorem 4.1 has a number of useful corollaries.
COROLLARY 4.2. Consider any game with biased costs G = G,Ĝ over a seriesparallel network. Let f * be an equilibrium of G. Then for any type i,
PROOF. PW(G) = 1. Thus Theorem 4.1 holds with k = 1. 
PROOF. First, for affine functions, λ = 1, µ = 1 4 , thus
1/4 = 4 (by Lemma. 4.11 there is no better pair (λ, µ)). Second, for any k ≥ 1 and any f ,
We get the corollary by replacing the respective terms in Theorem 4.1. t) ) with biased costs G = G,Ĝ over a series-parallel network. Then,
and BPoA(G) =
In other words, the BPoA of a heterogeneous population on a directed series-parallel network is a weighted average of their worst-case BPoAs (multiplied by a constant that does not depend on the network or the population structure).
We get a similar BPoA bound for symmetric affine games. 
Ifĉ are also affine, then the constant in the bound is 4 · 4 3 = 16 3 . The BPoA bounds in this section cannot be directly compared with those in Section 5. Depending on the network structure and on the composition of the population, each bound may be significantly better than the other.
Suppose that only a subgroup of agents are biased arbitrarily (even adversarially), whereas all other agents are unbiased. In such a case some of the steps in the proof can be simplified and we get a simpler bound that depends only on the basic smoothness parameters and the structure of the network G. 
The proof is not entailed by Theorem 4.1, but rather follows the same steps, except for Lemma 4.9, which becomes redundant for unbiased agents. The proof strategy is to first show a useful property of an equilibrium in unbiased games with low parallel-width. Specifically, that even arbitrary behavior of other agents cannot hurt the individual much more than their equilibrium behavior (this part generalizes Theorem 5.7 in , stated for symmetric directed series-parallel games, to general routing games). Then, we find an upper bound on the equilibrium cost in the single-type biased gameĜ i,k , and hence the cost for each type i in game G.
Proof of the main result
We will need a sequence of lemmas. Let f * be an equilibrium of G, and let g * be an equilibrium of G i,k . We argue that in f * , a type i agent is no worse than under strategy profile g * . Formally, since all agents in g * have the same cost, the cost c i (p, g * ) of any used path p ∈ P i (g * )is the same, and denoted by C i,k . Similarly, all type i agents have the same cost in f * , which is C * = c i (p, f * ) at any used path p ∈ P i (f * ).
For k = 1 (i.e., series-parallel graphs), this means C * ≤ C i , i.e. the cost of all agents only increase when all are of the same type.
thus in each path p ∈ P , there is an edge e = e p ∈ p s.t. c Consider the weighted graph H = (V, p∈P p), where the capacity (weight) of every edge e is g * e . Consider the set {e p |p ∈ P }, which is a cut between s i and t i in H. Let E ⊆ {e p |p ∈ P } s.t. E is a minimal cut (not minimum cut), then
The last inequality follows from the min-cut-max-flow theorem, since E is still a s i − t i cut in H, and the flow between s i , t i is exactly k · r in any valid flow of G i,k . Now, as there are only r agents in G = (G, c, r), there must be an agent in profile f * using strictly more than k edges from E. Denote the path of this agent by p ′ ∈ A i , and S = p ′ ∩ E, then |S| > k. Finally, S are contained in the minimal cut E between s i , t i (thus S is parallel), and S is also contained by the simple path p ′ . By definition of width, PW(G) ≥ |S| > k, which is a contradiction to our assumption. 
The last equality follows by taking the derivative w.r.t. q. Also note that 1 − t 2 = (1 + t)(1 − t) < 2(1 − t), thus min qz c (q) ≤
LEMMA 4.9. For every x > 0, and every type i, it holds that:
PROOF. Define quantity x ′ = 0, so that:
Hence c(x) −ĉ i (x) ≤μ i c(x), and inequality (a) follows. For (b), let q > 1 and consider
By taking inf q>1 z c (q) we get the result from Lemma 4.8.
Recall our previous definition of g * (an equilibrium of G i,k ). We similarly defineĝ * as an equilibrium ofĜ i,k .
LEMMA 4.10. The two following bounds apply:
PROOF. Since by definitionĜ i (and thus alsoĜ
Thus to get (a), we denote the optimal flow in
(By definition of the social cost)
(from Lemma 4.9(b))
To get (b), we use the bi-criteria result from [Beckmann et al. 1956] , that the equilibrium cost in any nonatomic routing game (G, c, r) is bounded by the optimal cost (and thus by the cost of any profile) in the game (G, c, 2r), i.e. the same game with twice as many agents.
We denote the optimal flow in
) (note that this is a valid profile inĜ i,2k ), and continue very similarly to bound (a):
Having established all the required lemmas, we can continue with the main proof.
PROOF OF PROP. 4.1. Similarly to the definitions before Lemma 4.7, we definef * as an equilibrium ofĜ,Ĉ * =ĉ i (p,f * ) for some used path p ∈ P i (f * ), andĈ i,k =ĉ i (p,ĝ * ) for some used path p ∈ P i (ĝ * ). Note thatĈ * ,Ĉ i,k are not effected by which used path we choose.
By Lemma 4.7 applied to gamesĜ,Ĝ
On the other hand, for any used path p ∈ P i (f * ), by Lemma 4.9(a)
Combining the above bounds, the total cost for all type i agents inf * can be bounded as follows:
Finally, we get the two bounds of the proposition by plugging in either of the two bounds of Lemma 4.10.
A single smoothness parameter. For a given class of cost functions, we denote their smoothness parameters by (λ, µ λ ), i.e. by fixing λ ≥ 1 (necessary for any class that includes constant functions), and finding the minimal µ = µ λ s.t. that all functions in the class are (λ, µ) smooth. Recall that 
We suspect that this is true for all function classes. 
PROOF. Consider any class of polynomial functions of degree at most d. It is not hard to show that
µ λ = dλ (λ(1+d))
2004]).
Then for affine functions (d = 1) we get
) 2 , and for quadratic functions (d = 2) we get
. Both functions are strictly increasing in λ for λ ≥ 1, thus attain a minimum at λ = 1.
Necessity of restricted structure
Our main theorem relies on the restricted structure of the underlying graph. We next provide complementary results showing that: (a) in networks that are not seriesparallel, even a small fraction of biased agents can increase the cost for all others by an arbitrary factor; (b) the bound in Lemma 4.7 (which connects structure and social cost) cannot be improved; and (c) the bound in the main theorem cannot be improved by more than a constant factor.
PROPOSITION 4.12. Consider any graph such that PW(G) > 1. For any ǫ > 0 and any M ′ > 0, there is a symmetric game with biases G = (G,Ĝ) and equilibria f * ∈ EQ(G),f * ∈ EQ(Ĝ), such that:
• Only a fraction r 2 = ǫ of the agents in G are biased;
• For the unbiased type 1,
PROOF. By Lemma 2.5 it is sufficient to construct a bad example on the Braess graph to prove the proposition.
Indeed, consider the network in Figure 3 , where the value M is some large number that will be set later on. Suppose the total mass is one unit, and that all agents need to flow from s to t. In the game G, costs are as in Figure 3 (a) . Thus in the equilibrium f * , the agents will split evenly among the paths s − a − t and s − b − t, so that each agent incurs the same cost of (2 · 1/2) M = 1 M = 1, and thus SC 1 (f * , G) = r 1 = 1 − ǫ. Now, denote the unbiased agents as type 1, and suppose that some fraction r 2 = ǫ > 0 of agents is of a type 2, with biased costsĉ 2 . See Figure 3 (b). In the equilibriumf * , all type 2 agents will select the path s − a − b − t, whereas all type 1 agents will split evenly. Thus there will bef * e = 1 2 + ǫ 2 > f * e agents on each edge s − a and b − t.
We now compute the cost for the type 1 agents inf
For every such agent taking the path p = (s − a − t), the cost is
Thus the total cost for type 1 agents is
as required.
Since the cost functions used in this proof are not smooth, this result cannot be compared with the bounds in Theorem 4.1. Hence we provide two additional results.
Recall that for a specific type i, we denote by C * the cost all type i agents experience in equilibrium of G (with mixed population), and that C i,k is the cost to each agent in the equilibrium of game G i,k . Lemma 4.7 shows that C * ≤ C i,k for any game with parallel-width k. We next show that this cannot be further improved. This is true regardless of the cost functions in the game. An alternative interpretation of the proposition is that in a symmetric game, changing the (cost/demand) type of all agents of type = i can have the same effect on i's cost as multiplying the mass by k.
PROOF. For k = 1, it trivially holds that C * = c(1) = C i if all agents need to travel a single edge e with cost c e ≡ c. Thus assume k ≥ 2.
Since By Lemma 2.5 G must contain the k-crossed-parallel graph CP (k) as a minor, it is sufficient to construct such a game on G = CP (k), see Fig. 4 . All agents need to get from s to t. We define edge costs as follows. For type i = 1, we set r i = ǫ and costs c i ab (x) = c(x). The cost of all other edges is 0.
For type j = 2, we set r j = 1 − ǫ, and the costs are c
Thus in the unique equilibrium g * of game G i,k , the agents (k in total) split evenly over all k paths, and
(1) = c(1). In the unique equilibrium f * of game G, all type j agents take the long path p = (s, b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , a 3 , b 3 
The type i agents split evenly over all k paths, and thus each experiences a cost of (1) P W (G) = k; (2) inĜ there are r i agents of type i, and j≤m r j = 1; 
PROOF. Consider the k-Cross-Parallel graph G CP (k) (see Fig. 4 ), with one additional edge e st . We define the real costs as follows:
There is a mass of r = 1 agents, and all paths from s to t are allowed (the game is symmetric). In the equilibrium flow of G i,k the mass rk = k splits evenly among all k parallel paths (excluding e st ), and the cost for each agent is c ab (1) = 1. In particular, OP T (G i,k ) = k. Similarly, in the flow of G where all agents split evenly, OP T (G) = r · c ab (
We now define the modified costs. For type i,ĉ i ab (x) = qx, whereas all other costs remain unchanged. For all other agents (denote as type j), we setĉ In any equilibrium ofĜ, all type j agents follow the long path (s, b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , . . . , b k−1 , a k , t). Hence for any path that includes an a − b edge, the cost for i is at leastĉ i ab (r j ) = q · r j > q 2 . Thus in the only equilibriumf * , all type i agents will select the direct path e st and experience a cost of q 2 . Putting everything together,
Since we only used affine cost functions, the bounds in both Theorem 4.1 and Cor. 4.5 are tight up to a constant. Also, since the graph used in the proof is a minor of the G CP (k+1) , and thus By Lemma 2.5 a minor of any graph with PW(G) > k, the example in Prop 4.14 can be constructed for any graph G with PW(G) > k.
STRUCTURE-INDEPENDENT BOUNDS
In general, there may be many types of agents in a game, each with a different behavioral bias. For example we can have agents with various levels of toll-sensitivity or pessimism, a small number of adversarial agents, and so on. Our main goal is to provide claims about the welfare achieved in the equilibria that correspond to such populations. We start with a relatively simple result, leveraging known PoA bounds in games with player-specific costs [Gairing et al. 2011 ] to BPoA bounds in biased games with heterogeneous agents. These are bounds that do not depend on the network structure, but only on the cost functions.
Formally, for two sets of cost functions, denote by ∆(c,ĉ, r) = max e∈E sup x∈ [0,r] ce (x) ce(x) . Let Ψ(G) = max i,j≤m ∆(c i , c j , r).
Intuitively, the PoA is low if for each edge e, all functions (c i e ) i≤m attain similar values for all x. We can use this PoA bound to prove a similar BPoA bound that is Playing the Wrong Game A:21 independent of the network structure. Given a game with biased costs G = G,Ĝ , let 
PROOF. Consider games G andĜ, both over the network G = (V, E). For any flow f , we have
, which is a constant independent of the network G.
Finally, 
which entails the theorem.
If G is biased smooth, we can use smoothness parameters to bound Φ(G) and Φ(G).
LEMMA 5.3. Suppose that c is a degree d polynomial, and (λ,μ)-biased smooth w.r.t. c. Then for all x ≥ 0, where e is the natural logarithm base) .
For the second part,
as required. 
PROOF. By Lemma 5.3,
By combining the above bounds with Theorem 5.2,the proof is complete.
POA IN HETEROGENEOUS GAMES
While our focus in this paper is on biased games, some of our insights can be applied to understand PoA in heterogeneous games. Specifically, we show that PoA in (heterogeneous) PNRGs can be arbitrarily high even when all agents have affine costs. PROOF. Consider a graph that is an undirected cycle with m = M + 1 vertices (such a graph can be implemented by a directed graph as well). For each i ≤ m, we have s i = i and t i = (i + 1) modm . Denote e i = (s i , t i ). For type i agents, the cost function is c i e i (x) = x and c i e (x) = 1 for all other edges. Suppose r i = 1 for all i. In the optimal flow f o , all type i agents use edge e i , and thus SC(f o , G) = i≤m r i c i e i (1) = i≤m r i = m. Now consider flow f * , where agent of each type i travel the long path from s i to t i using m − 1 edges. f * is an equilibrium, since the cost for each agent of type i is m − 1, whereas the cost on the alternative short path is c Interestingly, the directed version of the graph G in the example has P W (G) = m, and we see no obvious way of using a simpler graph. We conjecture that there is a PoA bound similar to that in our main theorem, i.e., that depends on the "average" smoothness bounds and on the parallel width of the underlying graph. If true, this would mean in particular that the PoA of affine heterogeneous games on series-parallel graphs is a constant.
BIASED SMOOTHNESS BOUNDS FOR SPECIFIC BIASES
In this section we summarize both known results and new results on biasedsmoothness bounds, for specific biases and various classes of cost functions. We focus on 3 biases that have been studied in the context of nonatomic routing games, namely tolls, pessimism, and risk aversion (the latter two are conceptually similar, but technically different). Most of these bounds are for the homogenous case, but can be combined using the results in the previous sections to BPoA bounds for heterogeneous populations.
Toll-Sensitive Agents
In this section, we consider the role of biases in the context of tolls. In particular, suppose that the center imposes the optimal toll of c ′ e (x)x on every edge e. For an agent with toll sensitivity β ≥ 0, we haveĉ β (x) = c(x) + βc ′ (x)x, and the monetary part of the cost is adjusted by a factor of β. We will assume that all agents have the same bias, and provide bounds on BPoA(G, β) ≡ BPoA(G,Ĝ β ). That is, to bound the efficiency loss in games where all agents have a bias β. When agents differ in their bias the results can be combined with the analysis of bounds under heterogeneous populations.
We consider four classes of games by generality of the cost functions: all standard cost functions, convex functions, polynomial functions with positive coefficients, and affine functions. For example, G affine stands for an arbitrary game with affine costs. Unlike in the previous section, all BPoA bounds hold regardless of the network topology. The results are summarized in Tables I and II. We consider a class of cost functions that are (λ, µ)-smooth, and recall that w.l.o.g. λ = 1 [Correa et al. 2008] . Clearly for β = 0, the players ignore the toll, and we get (λ,μ) = (λ, µ) = (1, µ), BPoA(G, β = 0) = 1 1−µ ; for β = 1 we get (λ,μ) = (1, 0), BPoA(G, β = 1) = 1 as explained in Section 3. 
This bound improves the BPoA bound of PROOF. Let c = c e , e ∈ E, and x, x ′ ≥ 0.
The BPoA bound follows immediately from Cor. 3.5.
In nonatomic games λ = 1, and hence β + (1 − β)λ = 1 as well.
PROPOSITION 7.2. Consider an arbitrary game G. For toll sensitivity β ≥ 1, we haveλ = β,μ = 0, and BPoA(G, β) ≤ β.
PROOF. Denote h(x) = xc(x), and recall that h
(by convexity of h) PROPOSITION 7.3. Consider a game G conv,µ where of cost functions that are both convex (1, µ)-smooth (recall that λ = 1 w.l.o.g.). For β ≥ 1, we haveλ = 1 + (β − 1)µ,μ = β − 1, and thus BPoA (G conv,µ 
Again, note that in all NRGs λ = 1 and thusμ = 0.
In particular, we get a BPoA bound of 1 + β−1 4
for affine costs, and 1 + 2(β−1) 3 √ 3 for quadratic costs. These bounds are not tight, and we improve them in Section 7.1. Table I : Biased-smoothness bounds for toll-sensitivity For reference, we also show the upper bounds derived for arbitrary cost functions (in light gray, from Props. 7.1 and 7.2); using convexity only (thick green line, from Prop. 7.3); and from Meir and Parkes [2015] (dashed). All bounds apply to pessimistic and risk-averse agents (see Section 7.2).
Affine costs. We can derive tighter smoothness bounds for specific classes of cost functions and biases. The results for affine cost functions are summarized in Table II and in Figure 5 . We mention that Chen et al. [2014] reached the same BPoA bounds (which they call the Robust PoA) for all classes in Table II and β ≤ 1, but did not consider the case of β ≥ 1. Also, while they also applied smoothness-based technique, we believe our approach can be more easily translated to atomic games (as in [Meir and Parkes 2016] ) since it uses both smoothness parameters (λ,μ).
While the bounds for affine functions follow as a special case from Prop. 7.6 and Prop. 7.7, we lay out the shorter proofs for intuition. We need the following inequality, which is often used in the analysis of nonatomic games:
Recall that for an affine function c, c PROOF. We need to show that c(
c(x)x. We have:
We get the upper bound on the BPoA from biased-smoothness and Corollary 3.5. The lower bound is attained by the Pigou example G P (a, 1), for a = 1 β+1 . This follows from the analysis in Meir and Parkes [2015] , as we explain in the next section, but we directly derive the lower bound for completeness in the appendix. 
4β . This bound is tight.
The lower bound is attained by the Pigou example G P (a, 1), for a = Table II 
This is a tight bound.
Note that for β = 0, we get the familiar PoA bound of
, whereas for β = 1 we get that the BPoA is 1. PROPOSITION 7.7. For toll sensitivity β ≥ 1, polynomial cost functions of degree d are (
. This is a tight bound. Note that as degree d grows, the bound approaches 1 − 1 e β . In contrast, by using Prop. 7.3 we only get a bound of µβ + O(1), which tends to β + O(1) as the degree d grows. That is, the bound attainable by only using the convexity property of polynomial costs is greater by a multiplicative factor.
In particular, for both propositions we get tight bounds for the BPoA under quadratic cost functions, which are presented in Table II and in Fig. 6. 
Pessimism in the Worst-case Cost Model
Suppose now that agents are pessimistic, in the sense that they play according to a congestion amount that is larger by a factor of α > 1 than the true congestion [Meir and Parkes 2015] , that is,ĉ α (x) = c(αx). 11 For affine cost functions, it holds
and pessimism with factor α ≥ 1 coincides with toll-sensitivity of β = α − 1.
As a result, we can immediately apply the upper bounds for toll-sensitive agents to pessimistic agents with affine cost functions (see Fig. 5 ).
Lower bounds for pessimistic agents were previously derived in Meir and Parkes [2015] , and thus we can also go in the other direction and apply them to the tollsensitive agents. This correspondence between toll-sensitive agents (for affine costs) and risk-averse agents provides an explanation as to why a little uncertainty (or pessimism) initially improves the BPoA, but too much of it hurts: the biased cost increases (due to pessimism) until it reaches the point of optimal tolls, but then goes past it.
Heterogeneous population. Returning to diverse populations, another result from Meir and Parkes [2015] that we can apply to toll-sensitive agents with affine costs, relates to diverse populations. Consider a game with heterogeneous toll sensitivities (β i ) i≤m , and let β = min i β i , and β = max i β i . THEOREM 7.8 (DIRECT COROLLARY FROM MEIR AND PARKES [2015] ). For any affine NRG G and toll sensitivities β = (β i ) i≤m :
Corollary 4.5 provides a more general bound than Theorem 7.8, albeit with higher constants.
Higher order polynomials. We can apply a similar analysis to other cost functions, although this may lead to different results. Just considering higher order polynomials breaks the correspondence with toll-sensitivity. For example, for quadratic costs:
In particular, the BPoA is no longer linear in α. For example, for quadratic cost functions with α > 2, the BPoA is between . In addition, while for some value of α > 1 the social cost improves, it does not reach a BPoA of 1, except for affine cost functions.
Risk Aversion in the Mean-Var Model
Following , we now consider an arbitrary cost function c(x) and an arbitrary distribution ǫ(x) s.t. var(ǫ(x)) ≤ κc(x) for all x > 0. Denote v(x) = var(ǫ(x)) ≥ 0, and suppose that c(x) is (1, µ)-smooth for some µ < 1. Define the biased cost asĉ γ (x) = c(x) + γv(x). Nikolova and Stier-Moses bounded the Price of Risk Aversion (PRA), which is the ratio between the social welfare in the biased equilibrium and that in the non-biased equilibrium. Their main result is that the PRA is upper bounded by 1 + κγη, where η is a parameter that depends on the network and may be as large as the number of vertices. In particular this leads to a bound of BPoA(G µ,η , γ, κ) ≤ (1 + γκη) 1 1−µ for any (1, µ)-smooth game with network parameter η under risk aversion with parameters γ, κ.
We show the following:
An immediate corollary is that for any (1, µ)-smooth game G µ under risk aversion with parameters γ, κ, we have
This result improves not just the BPoA bound that follows from Nikolova and StierMoses [2015] , but also their PRA bound. Because the unbiased equilibrium is at least at costly as the optimal flow, it follows that the PRA is at most the (biased) PoA, and is thus upper bounded by (1 + γκ) 1 1−µ . Crucially, µ is fixed and does not depend on the network structure. This shows that the factor η is not so crucial when considering either the BPoA or the PRA.
We should note however that for some parameter values (namely when η is small and the actual equilibrium ofĜ is not much better than the worst-case bound), the bound given by is better than ours by a constant factor.
Heterogeneous biases. Kleer at al. [2016] prove that for series-parallel graphs, the PRA can be bounded by the weighted average of the PRAs over all types. Our Corollary 4.4 is in the same spirit, but without specifying the exact bias of the agents.
DISCUSSION

Related Work
Various modified cost functions have been considered in the literature of congestion games. A primary example is when tolls are imposed on players using an edge, where the travel time plus the imposed toll can be thought of as a modified cost function.
Various papers consider the effect of given toll schemes on the total latency [Cole et al. 2003; Fleischer et al. 2004; Kleer and Schäfer 2016] or show how to design optimal toll schemes [Bonifaci et al. 2011; Jelinek et al. 2014; Fotakis et al. 2015] . We explained in the relevant sections how these papers relate to our work conceptually or technically. Specifically, some of these papers consider heterogeneous tollsensitivity, but only for networks that are parallel or series-parallel. We thus hope that our results and techniques could be useful to generalize these papers.
Chen et al. [2011] apply smoothness analysis to provide BPoA bounds for various games (including atomic congestion games) where players are altruistic, i.e., part of their utility is derived from the social welfare. They also bound the BPoA in parallellinks games with two levels of altruism via direct analysis. Acemoglu et al. [2016] study nonatomic congestion games where some agents are unaware of the existence of certain edges, which is equivalent to having a wrong cost function that assigns infinite costs to some edges. They prove that on directed seriesparallel graphs, such ignorance can only lead to a worse equilibrium than under true information, yet worst-case PoA does not exceed the bound of λ 1−µ . Christodoulou et al. [2014] propose coordination mechanisms for nonatomic congestion games, where the modified cost can be increased arbitrarily. However in contrast with most of the literature on introducing tolls into congestion games, the modified costs are considered real rather than biased, in the sense that the social cost consists of both the latency and the tolls.
Another behavioral bias that has been studied in congestion games is risk aversion [Ashlagi et al. 2009; Angelidakis et al. 2013; Piliouras et al. 2013; Meir and Parkes 2015] . In some of these models, the behavior of a risk averse agent coincides with that of a rational agent with a particular biased cost function (see Sections 7.2, 7.3). We make a detailed comparison in the relevant sections. The only result we are aware of for heterogeneous biases on nonparallel graphs is by Meir and Parkes [2015] , who bound the BPoA in affine games with pessimist agents. Our current results substantially generalize this bound, albeit with higher constants.
Finally, Babaioff et al. [2007] consider congestion games where some of the players are malicious. We can reformulate such a game as a biased game, where malicious behavior corresponds to an arbitrary bias.
Conclusion
We have considered strategic settings in which participants are playing the wrong game, and perceiving utilities in some inaccurate or biased form. Whether these modified utilities, and thus deviations from rational play, come from a cognitive limitation, a behavioral bias, or a different perception in regard to tolls or other payments, it is important to understand how the equilibria of the game are affected.
Biased smoothness is a tool that enables Price of Anarchy (PoA) analysis under such modified utilities. Our work is the first to provide PoA bounds on populations with heterogeneous arbitrary biases in nonatomic congestion games, and the first to consider heterogeneous biases in arbitrary networks. The analysis framework reduces the problem to that of analyzing the smoothness parameters of each payoff and behavioral agent type.
It is true that in nonatomic congestion games, PoA bounds attained with smoothness techniques do not automatically extend to broader classes of equilibria (since in contrast to atomic games, in nonatomic games all equilibria have the same cost [Blum et al. 2006] ). However, our work shows that smoothness bounds have a different advantage, as they allow us to combine PoA bounds in games with heterogeneous types.
Future research directions include deriving PoA bounds under other biases and for more classes of cost functions. A fundamental question is whether our results on heterogeneous populations with either specific or arbitrary biases can be extended, namely relaxing some of the assumptions in our main result or its corollaries. In particular, we suspect that there is a structure-independent bound for the BPoA. PROOF OF TIGHTNESS. Note that for any state f , SC (G, f ) = (1 − f ) + af 2 . Consider the Pigou example G P ( 1 1+β , 1), i.e., where c 1 (x) = 1, c 2 (x) = 1 1+β x. Let f * = f * 2 be the equilibrium load on edge 2. In equilibrium, the biased cost on both edges is the same, thus 1 =ĉ Consider the state f ′ where f ′ = 1. Then SC (f ′ ) = a. The BPoA is thus,
For tightness, consider the Pigou game G P (
In the state f ′ where f ′ 2 = 1, we have
In equilibrium f * , we have a · (1 + βd)(f * .
Finally,
